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Executive summary 
In Myanmar’s conflict-affected borderlands, there is one constant that links almost all 
stakeholders in some way – illicit drugs and the economies derived from them. This working 
paper, researched and written before the military coup of 1st February 2021, explores 
Myanmar’s drugs policy landscape through an analysis of the stakeholders engaged in: 
national and legal policy frameworks around the production, trafficking and use of drugs; 
drugs and health; drugs, rural livelihoods and alternative development; and drugs and 
peacebuilding. 
 
Myanmar’s borderlands are major sites for both the production and consumption of opium, 
heroin and methamphetamines. Drug production is often central to rural livelihoods. For 
some, drug cultivation is driven by long-standing marginalisation; for others, it is driven by 
new forms of livelihood insecurity and precarity that have emerged as a result of borderland 
development schemes. At the same time, drug use is driving new forms of risk, 
vulnerability, public health crises and social conflict, creating a complex set of challenges. 
The drug economy has a long history in Myanmar’s borderlands and is deeply embedded in 
rural power structures. All conflict parties are in some way involved; drugs have been 
rooted in efforts to finance armed conflict and counter-insurgency, as well as to shore up 
informal political arrangements aimed at stabilising conflict. The deep integration of drugs in 
borderland economies makes it very difficult to disentangle legal and illegal economies at 
both sub-national and national level. Drugs have been central to flourishing cross-border 
economies and are also important sources of investment in the national economy. Drug 
commodities involve the same actors and move though the same trade networks as legal 
commodities. As a result, illegal drug revenues have also become an important source of 
capital in the formal economy. 
  
Against this background, a wide range of stakeholders – international, national and sub-
national – engage with drug issues, giving rise to a complex set of narratives that are often 
at odds with each other. 
 
International focus on drug issues in Myanmar has shifted in recent decades as a result of 
the fact that few of Myanmar’s drugs now reach US and western markets, with the majority 
going to China, Southeast Asia, Japan and Australasia. China is now the dominant actor in 
terms of international pressures on drugs production, trafficking and conflict. However, 
there has been increased engagement by multilateral agencies and international non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) in response to the health implications of drug use in 
Myanmar; for example, multilaterals fund national harm reduction programmes, which are 
predominantly implemented by international NGOs (INGOs). There was also space for 
external engagement in the process of the national government revising its drugs 
legislation, resulting in an amended National Narcotics Law and a National Drugs Policy in 
2018. Although international influence shaped an intent to foreground individual and public 
health as central pillars of a new approach to drugs, the new law fell short of abolishing 
harsh penalties for drug possession, which in turn rendered much of the language in the 
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At the national level, the Myanmar government – concerned with preserving national 
sovereignty – has long been determined to resist external engagement on issues that it 
sees as domestic. Aid and diplomacy are also relatively weak levers for external influence; 
aid dependency is low and the government has rigidly resisted external involvement in the 
country’s peace process. These factors have limited the policy space for external 
engagement on sensitive domestic issues like drugs; government narratives about external 
actors wishing to engage with the country’s drug challenges have often focused on curbing 
demand for drugs and the supply of precursor chemicals. Tackling drugs in the country’s 
borderlands has been a lower concern for the national government than state-building, 
counter-insurgency, resource extraction and trade. Drugs have often been integrated into 
these wider agendas – for example, through tolerance of illegal revenue flows into both the 
national economy and under-funded local administrations, and to the off-budget revenue of 
army-backed militias. 
 
At a sub-national level, there are major concerns about the rise of harmful drug use, which 
for several decades have been a major driver of the country’s HIV epidemic. There is also 
strong resentment towards the impunity afforded to politically connected major players in 
the drug trade, while policing on drug issues tends to target small-scale users and sellers – 
leading to people serving long prison sentences for minor offences. Drug narratives are 
suffused with wider grievance narratives around the neglect and exploitation of ethnic 
minority populations, to the point that worsening levels of drug harms among ethnic minority 
populations are viewed in some popular narratives as an intentional military strategy. A 
case in point is the spread of drug use under the 17-year ceasefire in Kachin State, where 
such popular narratives are embedded in the rise of local anti-drug activities, especially the 
Church-based Pat Jasan movement. This significant development in the drug landscape in 
Myanmar has been highly controversial – critical as it is of both national and international 
responses to drug issues.  
 
These examples of narratives around drugs from different levels show that there is often a 
tension across two dimensions: the ‘theatre’ of drugs interventions, and the lived 
experiences of people caught up with or connected to drug issues and their borderland illicit 
economies.  
 
For international actors trying to engage with drug issues in Myanmar, what then are the 
key areas of consideration that emerge from this stakeholder analysis? The paper 
concludes that: 
 
1. Domestic drugs policy and practice is rife with disconnects and contradictions. 
 
2. The most influential actors shaping the drug economy are the hardest for 
international actors to interact with and influence. 
 
3. There are significant tensions between drug production and drug use, as drug 
production is central to the livelihoods of the poor, but drug use is creating new forms 
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4. Drugs are a low political priority for government in the borderlands, but not for local 
populations, who view drugs as a major issue. 
 
5. Fragmented political authority shapes the possibilities for health-based approaches 
to drugs. 
 
6. There is a huge local need for more education and support on issues surrounding 
drugs issues, to address stigma and to support local communities struggling to cope 
with drug-related harms. At the same time, for locally supported solutions to emerge, 
there is a need for external programmes to engage more deeply with local 
narratives, attitudes and beliefs around drugs. 
 
7. Despite hopes that the peace process would open up space to address drugs, there 
was an absence of discussions around narcotics in the negotiations. Particularly 
against the backdrop of the February 2021 coup, space to include drugs in a 
negotiated peace may now be closed.  
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1. Introduction  
 
After decades of armed conflict and international isolation, Myanmar’s 2010 general 
election appeared as a watershed moment. The new quasi-civilian government embarked 
upon a series of political and economic reforms and launched a formal peace process in 
2011, the first official nationwide peace overture since 1963. These developments inspired 
hopes that Myanmar was embarking upon what the World Bank dubbed as a ‘triple 
transition’: from authoritarian military rule to democratic governance, from a centrally 
directed economy to a market-oriented economy, and from 60 years of conflict to peace in 
the country’s border areas. Aung San Suu Kyi’s landslide election victory in 2015 further 
inspired hopes that the country was embarking upon a pathway to peace, democracy and 
prosperity in which international actors could play an important role. All these factors led to 
a vast expansion in development aid and programmes in Myanmar. In 2011, Myanmar 
received US$357 million in development aid (Asia Foundation, 2018). By 2015 this had 
risen to US$3.4 billion. In 2013, Myanmar became the world’s third largest recipient of aid, 
a meteoric rise from its 79th position in 2010. Aid per capita rose more than tenfold 
between 2010 and 2015 (Asia Foundation, 2018). 
 
However, amid these changes there has been very limited engagement with drug issues as 
part of wider peacebuilding, development and health efforts. This is despite the fact that 
Myanmar is the world’s second largest producer of illicit opium/heroin and one of the major 
global producers of methamphetamines, and despite the fact that rising levels of drug harm 
have become a major issue of concern especially in the country’s ethnically diverse, 
conflict-affected borderlands. This working paper aims to provide an overview of key 
contemporary dynamics, narratives, actors, programmes and policy processes surrounding 
drug issues in Myanmar. A key finding of this paper is that policy space for engaging with 
drug issues, especially in the peace process, is highly constricted. In essence, the reasons 
for this lie in the fact that drugs have become such a sensitive issue because they are not 
merely confined to rebel and criminal networks beyond the state and the formal economy; 
drugs are also deeply embedded in systems of borderland governance, ceasefire 
arrangements, militarised state-building and economic development.  
 
Addressing drug issues has been a lower priority than the pursuit of wider political and 
economic strategies in drug-affected borderland regions. Indeed, informal agreements 
around the drug trade have often become an important part of efforts to stabilise armed 
conflict, consolidate state control and finance local institutions, as well as offering 
opportunities for profit around these processes. Bitter legacies of colonial rule have also 
invoked a long-standing and deep-seated distrust among Myanmar’s governing elites of 
external engagement and instilled a strong emphasis upon the sanctity of national 
sovereignty. This is a history and perspective that the country’s elites share with China, 
which is the most influential external actor in Myanmar. Consequently, there has been 
strong resistance to any form of external mediation in the country’s armed conflict or on 
contentious issues – such as drugs – that are deemed to be domestic political issues. The 
fact that the political and economic reforms and the peace process launched in Myanmar 
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after 2010 are domestically owned and have emerged under the auspices of the country’s 
powerful military elites provides further insights into why there has been such limited 
engagement on drug issues. 
 
Responding to the health implications of drug use has, however, provided some platforms 
for more international engagement. Specifically, the significant HIV epidemic among people 
who inject drugs is widely agreed to be a critical issue impacting health and development 
across the country. Yet while harm reduction has been endorsed at a national level, the gap 
between the scale of harm reduction programmatic activity relative to the actual need is 
vast. Part of this relates to how generally limited health, education and welfare provision is 
across Myanmar. Systematic underinvestment over many decades has created a failed 
health system and while levels of investment are creeping up, they remain extremely low. 
Therefore, the capacity to drive health responses to drug issues is limited by wider 
structural issues. Another key factor is the limited government territorial control, which 
means that drug-related health programmes initiated either by the government or through 
government-sanctioned work (e.g. INGOs) largely take place only in government-controlled 
areas. This deep spatial inequality in services coverage is often a direct effect of armed 
conflict.  
 
Myanmar’s political system more generally is characterised by the highly centralised nature 
of the state, where the show (or theatre) of an emerging democratic system prior to the 
February 2021 coup contrasted with its non-democratic features, which include the 
overwhelming power the military retains in key areas where state policymaking takes place. 
Yet the reach of the central state, particularly into the borderlands, is limited and these 
spatial differences are a hallmark of more general governance and power relationships in 
Myanmar, including in relation to drug policies and responses. This results in a dynamic 
between national and international drug policy and programmes that in many ways is a 
theatre where actors on both sides commit to tackling drugs production and addressing the 
drug-related health harms, but in reality have a very limited capacity to enact these 
responses given the lack of state control over significant amounts of geographical territory. 
It also means that borderland governance has continued to evolve in an ostensibly less 
structured way but by no means with less intensity. It is in the borderlands that the nexus of 
armed groups, militias and neighbouring countries such as China meet. Throughout all 
these dynamics, illicit economies, including those related to illicit drugs, are negotiated and 
enacted including the negotiations between the central state and the peripheries. 
 
Part 1 of this working paper outlines some of these overarching issues by providing a brief 
overview of the political economy of the drug trade in Myanmar. The purpose of this section 
is to outline some of the most salient foundations upon which Myanmar’s post-2010 
reforms, the peace process, and efforts at international engagement emerged. These 
insights help to explain why drug issues have remained a largely peripheral issue in policy 
debates and programmes of both government and international actors. This is despite the 
significance of drugs to the political economy of conflict-affected borderland regions and the 
importance of drug-related harms in shaping local perspectives on the possibilities, 
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Following this overview, the rest of the paper addresses four key areas: (1) National legal 
and policy frameworks surrounding drugs; (2) Drug issues and the peace process; (3) 
Drugs and health; and (4) Drugs and livelihoods/rural development. This paper is by no 
means an exhaustive review of these sectors; rather it focuses on the extent to which 
policies and programmes within these sectors have engaged with drug issues. The paper 
concentrates primarily on national and international actors and their engagement in policies 
and programmes operating across Kachin State and Shan State. While we explore the 
disconnect between national and international actors at the sub-national level, we do not 
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2. Drugs, conflict and borderland 
governance in Myanmar:  
A brief overview 
 
Drugs and conflict, 1948-1988  
 
Opium cultivation has a long history in Myanmar, concentrated in the hill areas of Shan 
State and parts of Kachin State. These borderland regions are ethnically diverse and 
represent a complex mosaic of autonomous authorities that have historically never been 
under the firm control of a single state (Sadan, 2013, 2016; Thant Myint-U, 2020). Since 
Myanmar’s independence in 1948, the country’s formal political system has been highly 
centralised and has been dominated by political elites hailing from the country’s ethnic 
Bamar majority. State-building discourses have sought to make borderland regions and 
their ethnically diverse populations appear as natural, uncontested parts of the Myanmar 
nation-state. Yet, concurrent government narratives of the risks of disunity and 
fragmentation have been used to justify the deployment of extreme forms of violence to 
strengthen state control. These strategies, and the resistance they have evoked from an 
array of ethnic armed groups, have underpinned the Myanmar’s long-standing armed 
conflict (Smith, 1999; Lintner 1999). 
 
Opium production and trading networks pre-dated the onset of large-scale armed conflict in 
the 1950s and 1960s, but they expanded significantly through the following decades of 
armed conflict and became deeply embedded in the political economy of Shan and Kachin 
states. Opium production in Shan State began exponentially increasing in the 1950s and 
was used to resource and arm the Kuomintang (KMT) troops who had fled the Chinese civil 
war. The KMT reorganisation and expansion was seen favourably by a range of actors 
including Thailand and the USA, who prioritised the KMT’s role as a buffer to China’s 
communist expansion over their growing opium production (Meehan, 2011). Opium stood at 
the intersection of the ‘war economy’ (financing insurgency and also counter-insurgency 
activities), the ‘coping economy’ (becoming crucial to impoverished rural livelihoods) and 
the ‘shadow economy’ (attracting a network of entrepreneurs who invested in the drug trade 
as a means to generate profit) (Goodhand 2004; Chao Tzang Yawnghwe, 2005). Over time, 
conflict among various armed groups for control over key opium trade routes and market 
share added a further dimension to the country’s complicated armed conflict, especially 
across Shan State and the Thai-Shan border region.  
 
Although the opium economy became closely associated with financing insurgency, it also 
became deeply embedded in various counter-insurgency campaigns led by the Myanmar 
Army. Throughout Shan State especially, the Myanmar Army has, over the years, 
supported the formation of a wide array of militia groups. Their involvement in the drug 
trade enabled these groups to be self-financing, while informal military protection and 
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access to the legal economy strengthened their buy-in to Myanmar’s military-state system. 
These militias remain active players in the region’s drug economy and have also invested in 
an array of legal business enterprises both within their localities and in places like 
Mandalay, Yangon and Yunnan.     
 
Drugs also became an issue upon which both ethnic armed resistance movements and the 
government sought to garner international attention and backing. Successive central 
governments have sought to tarnish armed resistance movements by implicating them in 
the drug trade and arguing that the revenues derived from illicit economies is now their 
main reason for resisting the state. In turn, ethnic armed organisations have long drawn 
attention to how the drug trade is deeply embedded in processes of militarised state-
building. In recent decades, rising levels of drug harm have also created a common 
narrative among borderland populations that the spread of drugs has become an intentional 
military strategy – or ‘cold war’ – to further weaken resistance.   
 
Drugs and ceasefire politics, 1988-2010 
 
Widespread pro-democracy protests in 1988 led to the resignation of General Ne Win who 
had ruled the country as a military dictatorship since 1962. In his place a new military junta 
took control. The continuation of authoritarian military rule, the crushing of opposition and 
subsequent western sanctions created a commonly held conception of Myanmar as a 
stagnating backwater. Yet, through the 1990s and 2000s, there was a series of decisive 
shifts in Myanmar’s political economy in which the country’s drug-producing borderlands 
were central (Woods, 2011; Meehan, 2011; Jones, 2014). The changing conflict, political 
and economic dynamics in Myanmar’s borderlands through the 1990s and 2000s set the 
foundations for Myanmar’s post-2010 transition and re-shaped the political economy of the 
drug trade. 
 
The rush to engage in Myanmar following the country’s 2010 general election initially out-
paced the ability – or willingness – to explore the complex conflict dynamics and political 
and economic foundations upon which the country’s post-2010 transition was based. The 
brief overview below of the changing conflict, political, and socio-economic dynamics that 
emerged through the 1990s and 2000s provides an essential starting point for 
understanding the challenges that have faced Myanmar’s post-2010 reforms and 
peacebuilding efforts over the past decade, and why very little progress has been made in 
confronting drug issues.  
 
Changing conflict dynamics: After decades of armed conflict, the dynamics of Myanmar’s 
insurgency shifted in the late 1980s and 1990s. The new military government offered 
ceasefires to most of the country’s armed groups, which created a fragile stability in large 
areas of Kachin State and northern and eastern Shan State. The first of these ceasefires 
were offered to splinter groups of the Communist Party of Burma (CPB). The CPB had 
been the country’s largest insurgent group with extensive territorial control along the China 
border, but had collapsed in 1989. Opium cultivation had become widespread across much 
of the CPB’s territory, and the ceasefire arrangements included tacit agreement for these 
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groups to use the drug trade as a means to finance themselves. Rising levels of opium 
cultivation through the 1990s were concentrated in ceasefire areas, especially in eastern 
Shan State. Over time the Myanmar Army capitalised upon the fragile stability created by 
the ceasefires to pursue a process of prolonged militarisation of contested borderland 
regions. Through the 1990s and 2000s there was a significant expansion in the number of 
military barracks constructed across Shan and Kachin states and the number of army 
personnel stationed in these regions. These units were given limited central government 
funding beyond basic salaries and were instead required to ‘live off the land’. This was a 
euphemistic term used by central military command to emphasise the need for units to be 
self-financing. Militarisation thus became associated with widespread abuses, including 
land dispossession, arbitrary taxation and forced labour. The ‘live off the land policy’ also 
encouraged army personnel to seek ways to generate revenue from the country’s lucrative 
illicit economies. In many cases, this was in the form of protection fees, informal payments, 
and arbitrary taxation of cultivators, rather than direct control over illicit enterprises. 
However, it nonetheless created strong informal ties between expanding state institutions 
and the illicit drug economy.  
 
Changing economic dynamics: The military government’s ceasefire initiative in the late 
1980s/early 1990s was in part inspired by efforts to ‘open up’ the country’s borderlands for 
trade and resource extraction. The new military leadership installed after 1988 embraced a 
vision of military-led state re-building and saw the country’s resource-rich borderlands as a 
key tool for strengthening the national economy that had been crippled by near bankruptcy 
in the 1980s. These aspirations were also motivated by changes beyond the country’s 
borders. In China, government at both central and provincial level in Yunnan viewed 
improved economic ties with Myanmar as an opportunity to address the growing imbalance 
between China’s rapidly developing eastern coastal regions and the relative 
underdevelopment of its interior landlocked western provinces. The changing dynamics on 
both sides of the border resulted in a vast expansion in cross-border trade and inflows of 
investment into contested borderland regions. Much of this investment was concentrated on 
logging, mining (jade, gemstones, minerals, rare earth), large-scale agribusiness (especially 
rubber and fruit plantations) and major infrastructure projects including dams and oil and 
gas pipelines. 
 
Changing political dynamics: The ceasefires created a ‘no peace no war’ context across 
large parts of Kachin State and northern and eastern Shan State. The very ceasefire 
arrangements that served to reduce levels of outright violent conflict were exposing 
borderland populations to an array of violent and destructive forces including militarisation, 
continued counter-insurgency, exclusionary nationalism, dispossession and 
environmentally destructive development, all of which served to reinvigorate long-held 
resentment against the central government. It also became increasingly clear that under the 
ceasefires the balance of power was shifting in favour of Myanmar’s military government. 
This was reinforced by the country’s new constitution in 2008, which locked-in military 
dominance over the political system, and the government’s announcement in 2009 that all 
ceasefire groups were to be absorbed under the Myanmar Army as ‘Border Guard Forces’ 
(BGF). Throughout the 1990–2008 period the military government consistently informed 
ceasefire groups that as a transitional government it had no mandate to enter political 
dialogue until a new constitution had been enacted. The BGF proposal, however, marked a 
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clear volte face in which ceasefire groups were now demanded to surrender autonomy prior 
to any form of political dialogue. The government’s position also offered no 
acknowledgement of – or foundation to engage with – issues of federalism or the systems 
of governance administered by ethnic armed groups that provide health, education and 
justice systems to large populations.  
 
For the Myanmar Army, the ceasefire period of the 1990s and 2000s was viewed as largely 
successful. The army had wrestled a greater degree of control over contested borderland 
regions than at any time since the country’s independence, and the economy was on a far 
stronger footing (largely due to the expansion of cross-border trade, including oil and gas 
flows, and borderland resource extraction). The army had expanded significantly in size, 
weaponry and wealth, and the country now had a new constitution that entrenched military 
power. The foundations played an important part in encouraging military elites to believe 
they were in a strong enough position to instigate a political transition, marked in 2010 by 
the country’s first general election for 20 years, In contrast, for the country’s ethnic armed 
groups, this political ‘transition’ came at a time of crisis in the ceasefire system of the 
previous two decades. This included: a legitimacy crisis, in which the leadership of various 
armed groups became tarnished by claims that they were profiting through ceasefire 
arrangements from the exploitation of the people and environments they claimed to be 
protecting; a crisis of strategy, as the hope that ceasefire agreements would pave the way 
for more meaningful political dialogue faded away; and a military crisis, experienced by the 
increasing pressure ethnic armed groups faced from the Myanmar army. 
 
Changing dynamics surrounding drugs: The 1990s and 2000s witnessed several 
significant and long-lasting shifts surrounding Myanmar’s drug trade. These shifts have 
strongly influenced the ways in which drug issues have (or have not) been incorporated into 
Myanmar’s current peace process and political and economic reforms since 2010.  
 
First, Myanmar’s position within the global and regional drug economy underwent a 
significant shift. In the 1970s and 1980s much of Myanmar’s heroin reached western 
markets in the US and Europe. However, through the 1990s and 2000s China, Southeast 
Asia, Japan and Australasia became Myanmar’s primary heroin markets. China 
experienced a rapid increase in levels of heroin use through the 1980s and 1990s and most 
of the Myanmar’s heroin now services this market. Myanmar’s heroin production is now of 
greater concern to China and neighbouring countries than it is to the USA. Indeed, Chinese 
pressure played an important part in the decision among ex-CPB ceasefire groups along 
the China border in eastern Shan State to launch opium bans in the late 1990s and 2000s 
(although these were also in part motivated by efforts to have their leadership removed 
from US sanctions lists). These opium bans have largely held ever since and created a 
‘balloon effect’ in which levels of opium cultivation expanded across areas of Shan State 
without a long history of commercial production, including areas under the control of army-
backed militias. The opium bans also coincided with a vast expansion in methamphetamine 
production in Shan State, and ex-CPB ceasefire groups appeared to shift from 
opium/heroin production into meth production.  
 
Second, the ceasefire period instilled a highly permissive environment surrounding 
drugs. On all sides of the conflict, tackling the drug trade has been a secondary priority 
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behind other more pressing strategic aspirations. This has created an environment in which 
the Myanmar military-state has sought to co-opt the drug trade to fulfil wider state building 
and counter-insurgency agendas, rather than attempt to dismantle the drug trade in areas 
that have come under firmer state consolidation. In turn, for both army-backed militias and 
ethnic armed organisations, generating revenue from the drug economy has often remained 
a part of ongoing resistance efforts. This has created an environment in which there are 
strong vested interests on all sides to avoid tackling the drug trade. 
 
Third, drugs became deeply embedded in the emergence of a neoliberal economic 
system in Myanmar and neighbouring countries. From the 1980s, a new development 
paradigm of market-led development emerged across Southeast Asia, gradually replacing 
quasi-socialist and statist models. Across upland areas of Myanmar, Laos, Cambodia and 
Vietnam, post-socialist models of development focused on ‘opening up’ borderlands to 
markets and capital. In Myanmar, efforts to promote rapid development and weak 
regulations against illicit activities and money laundering meant that powerful 
interconnections emerged between the illegal and legal economy, with heroin being 
described as the ‘seed capital of the Burmese economy’ (Findlay, 2020; Meehan, 2011).    
 
Fourth, rising levels of drug-related harms have become a defining experience of the 
ceasefires among borderland populations. Much of the focus of the international 
community working on drug issues in Myanmar continues to be on stemming opiate 
production and trafficking to foreign markets. However, many communities throughout 
Myanmar’s borderlands view rising rates of harmful heroin and methamphetamine use as a 
more pressing issue than levels of opium cultivation (Drugs & (dis)order 2020). Rising 
levels of harmful drug use have become closely associated with economic shifts during the 
ceasefire period, with drug use proliferating in mining and logging areas. The way in which 
drugs have become embedded in borderland governance structures, described above, has 
also aroused strong resentment and a sense of powerlessness among borderland 
populations and a distrust in narratives surrounding ceasefires and borderland 
development. 
 
Fifth, the dynamics surrounding the drug trade during the ceasefire period have 
generated a series of competing narratives. The Myanmar government continues to 
attribute blame to ethnic armed organisations (especially those without ceasefires) while 
extolling the army’s counter-narcotics efforts. In contrast, a number of exiled research 
organisations generated an array of well-researched reports on the drug trade that focused 
primarily on the links between the Myanmar Army and the drug trade. These reports were 
largely ignored by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), which began to 
produce annual opium surveys in the early 2000s with the permission of the government. 
The emergence of a ‘blame game’ around drugs made this an issue that was particularly 
sensitive in the peace process. Counter-narcotics narratives have also become an 
important legitimising discourse for Chinese investment into both Myanmar and Laos. This 
narrative was increasingly deployed by provincial elites in Yunnan through the 1990s and 
2000s as part of longstanding efforts to convince the central Chinese government to relax 
border restrictions with Myanmar. Much Yunnan investment has been framed as part of 
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This brief overview of the political, economic and social dynamics that emerged through the 
1990s and 2000s provides an essential starting point for understanding the challenges that 
have faced peacebuilding efforts and borderland development over the past decade and 
why very little progress has been made in confronting drug issues. These issues are now 
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3. National legal and policy frameworks 
around the production, trafficking and 
use of illicit drugs in Myanmar  
 
Concerned by the increase in heroin use across the country in the early 1970s, the 
Burmese authorities adopted new legislation in 1974 known as the Narcotic and Dangerous 
Drugs Law. The law set out a series of interrelated actions including the provision of 
compulsory treatment and severe penalties for drug-related infractions, including the death 
sentence for certain categories of drug trafficking. To coordinate, design and implement a 
comprehensive programme under the law, the authorities established the Central 
Committee for Drug Abuse Control (CCDAC) which was chaired by the Minister of Home 
and Religious Affairs and included members from across a range of other relevant 
ministries including Agriculture, Health, Education and Social Welfare. Although Yangon 
authorities had received counter-narcotics support from the USA, CCDAC began a process 
of engagement with the United Nations Division of Narcotic Drugs and with the United 
Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control (UNFDAC). These engagements resulted in an 
agreement with the UN and the adoption of a five-year work plan from 1976 to 1981, costed 
at US$6.5 million, which was largely paid for by the government of Norway (Khant, 1985; 
Zealey, 1981). While this effort was official, set up and established centrally, the limited 
reach of the central government into the major drugs-producing regions in the borderlands 
was always going to challenge the ability to operationally implement programmes initiated 
under the national law. 
 
The integrated programme of work officially focused on several areas: 1) enforcing the ban 
on growing opium through crop eradication, 2) support for the development of alternative 
crops, 3) mandating the registration of people who use drugs to undergo detoxification and 
rehabilitation, and 4) the mobilisation of a nation-wide drug prevention campaign focused 
across media, communities and schools. Although the data is highly contested and 
impossible to corroborate, according to official Government of the Socialist Republic of the 
Union of Burma figures, by 1981 the authorities had eradicated a reported 41,000 acres of 
opium predominately from Shan State, had planted 46,000 acres of alternative agricultural 
consumption crops in Shan State (mainly rice paddy and maize) and despite chronic long-
term under-investment in health systems had developed a network of treatment and 
rehabilitation clinics in many urban centres around the country supported by health 
professionals and social workers (Khant, 1985; Zealey, 1981). In addition to these efforts 
but not covered by the programme, the Burmese military reported it was increasingly 
becoming involved in the identification and destruction of clandestine heroin producing 
laboratories in areas controlled by insurgent groups. These efforts were primarily supported 
by the USA but also supported by regional neighbours, including Thailand who cracked 
down on the movement of precursors associated with heroin production. The government 
was applauded by the UN and the USA for embarking on and implementing its programme, 
although the challenges of geography, agricultural practices and accessing insurgent areas 
were widely recognised. Throughout this entire period, however, there was ongoing and 
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overwhelming evidence of Burmese military involvement in all aspects of the drugs trade 
(Overholt, 1989). In addition, during this time, the Burmese military were actively operating 
brutal counter-insurgency operations against a range of opposition groups throughout Shan 
State, resulting in significant human rights violations across both armed organisations and 
local populations alike (Cline, 2009; Meehan, 2015). None of this stopped the UNFDAC 
programme from being funded for a further five years. 
 
By the mid-1980s, however, it was becoming clear that controlling drug production and use 
in Burma was challenging. The Burmese military embarked on further efforts to eradicate 
the production of opium, using aerial herbicides in large swathes of the geography across 
the Golden Triangle with support from the USA. The US support for the counter narcotics 
programme was estimated in 1987 to be US$11 million (Gray, 1987). Despite these efforts, 
authorities estimated that by 1987, over 900 tons of opium could be harvested that year, 
resulting in significant production and trafficking of the class A heroin known as S4. The 
extent of eradication efforts – with support from the USA – put Burma’s issues with its 
growing armed insurgencies into the spotlight. The prevailing narrative was that insurgents 
were reportedly fuelling their acquisition of arms with profits from the illicit drugs trade 
(Gray, 1987). Yet the Burmese military were using US support for counter narcotics 
operations – and the cover that it provided – to conduct its violent counter-insurgency 
programmes in Shan State, where it appeared that aerial herbicides were affecting local 
food production and causing widespread harm to humans and livestock. It was also clear 
that many of the opium fields in Shan State were spared aerial spraying as a result of 
formal or informal deals with the Burmese military (Mirante, 1989).   
 
The Myanmar military government’s brutal crackdown on pro-democracy protests in 1988, 
its failure to honour the result of the 1990s General Election and ongoing accusations of 
human rights violations isolated Myanmar from the international community who had 
implemented wide ranging sanctions on Myanmar. The USA withheld its counter narcotics 
support for several years after 1989, and by 1992 the US State Department reported that 
drugs production and trade and doubled since the State Law and Order Restoration Council 
(SLORC) came to power (Human Rights Watch, 1983). In 1993, under international 
pressure to respond to narcotics production and fall into line with the UN Drug Conventions, 
the SLORC introduced the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Law (1993) on 27 
January.1 The government claimed that the new law was intended to control the production, 
possession, trafficking and use of illicit narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances. 
Between 1992 and 1996, the SLORC embarked on a series of efforts aimed supporting its 
narrative around drug eradication in its border areas. They established the Ministry of 
Border Areas and National Races and Development Affairs in 1992 to develop a border 
area strategy that involved all of its main line agencies. It was premised on two priorities 
and its official aims were: 1) to eradicate drugs production and trade as a national duty, and 
2) to improve the social and economic lives of people living in the border areas. To 
demonstrate the government’s commitment to countering narcotics, the eradication of 
poppy fields began to escalate significantly. The government of Myanmar also partnered 
with the USA in implementing ten opium eradication surveys, which showed a significant 
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decrease in areas under opium production from 165,600 hectares in 1993 to 30,888 in 
2004. A similar monitoring programme in Shan State and the Wa Special Region in 
partnership with the United Nations Drug Control Programme (UNDCP) showed a halving 
of the hectares under opium production, from 81,400 in 2002 to 44,200 in 2004 (UNODC, 
2005). 
 
Yet the heavy focus on eradication and law enforcement was having no effect on the 
number of people using drugs, which was steadily increasing through the 1990s. This was 
further brought into focus by the high prevalence of HIV among people who were injecting 
drugs. In response to the HIV problem, the government of Myanmar endorsed harm 
reduction programmes as part of its National HIV/AIDS Strategy in 1996; however, needle 
possession by non-medical personnel was still criminalised under the 1917 Burma Excise 
Act (Kramer, 2016). The continued application of the 1993 drug law meant that people who 
used drugs – who did not mandatorily report themselves to authorities for treatment – were 
commonly arrested by the police. This resulted in Myanmar’s prison population being 
largely made up by people detained for between three and five years for minor drugs 
possession or suspected drug use charges. 
 
The rhetoric of drug control and eradication by the central government was not matched by 
the reality on the ground, particularly in the peripheries of Myanmar’s east and northeast 
borderlands where the central government’s reach was limited. As a result, Myanmar’s 
semi-autonomous border areas were essentially unaffected by national drug laws, and by 
1996 a range of actors had begun escalating the production and trafficking of 
methamphetamine tablets. Further evidence of the theatre of counter-narcotics efforts was 
the confirmation that CCDAC was embarking on an ambitious 15-year drug elimination 
strategy in 1999 in line with the region’s vacuous aspirational commitment to a drug-free 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) by 2015. The widespread emergence of 
methamphetamines alongside heroin was creating a dual security and health issue for 
Myanmar and highlighted the clear need to begin a process of reviewing the 1993 Narcotics 
Law. The drug law review process began formally in 2010, when CCDAC and UNODC held 
a joint workshop in Naypyidaw. In framing the meeting, CCDAC cited changing drug trends, 
persistently high rates of HIV among people who used drugs, and the limited geographical 
reach of harm reduction programmes as rationale for reviewing and amending the 1993 
Narcotics Law to ensure it could better respond to the public health implications of drugs in 
Myanmar.2   
 
A number of consultations followed and included discussions and reviews from a range of 
organisations with expertise in harm reduction, HIV and public health.3  In 2014, these 
organisations released an executive summary of recommendations for the amendment of 
the Myanmar 1993 Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Law. There were four 
main recommendations put forward by the working group to support the amendment: 
 
Creation of a legal framework for harm reduction and an effective HIV response.  
 
2 For more information see: www.unodc.org/southeastasiaandpacific/en/2010/04/drug-related-legislation/story.html. 
3 Organisations who contributed to the review process included Drug Policy Advocacy Group, WHO, Open Society Foundations (OSF), 
the Law Enforcement and HIV Network (LEAHN), TNI, UNAIDS and UNODC. 
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Removal of compulsory registration and treatment requirements. 
Decriminalisation of possession of small quantities of drugs for personal use. 
Alternative sentencing and judicial authority. 
 
These recommendations sought to bring the 1993 law further in line with global drug law 
norms that increasingly recognised individual and public health as key cornerstones of drug 
law development.  
 
Despite these significant efforts, the newly amended version of the 1993 Narcotic Drugs 
and Psychotropic Substances Law, enacted by the Union Parliament and released on 14 
February 2018, did not resolve many of the critical issues that advocates had described. 
Particularly, while the amended law abolished prison penalties for using small amounts of 
drugs, it did not decriminalise possession, which meant that users and primary poppy 
producers would still face automatic prison terms and undermined the very intent of the law 
reform process (Transnational Institute, 2018). Almost simultaneously, CCDAC released its 
National Drug Control Policy, which provided a harm-reduction framework and placed a 
cross-cutting human-rights-centred perspective on all matters related to drug production 
and use. The document complied with the International Drug Conventions and the 
Sustainable Development Goals as well as being informed by the approach of the United 
Nations General Assembly Special Session on the World Drug Problem (UNGASS) 2016 
(Government of Myanmar, n.d.). The inconsistencies between the two pieces of legislation 
have not been resolved. 
 
So, while the intent of the legislation seemed to suggest that law enforcement efforts would 
be focussed on larger drug producers and traffickers, this has not transpired. There has in 
fact been a continued and exponential increase in the production of illicit drugs, particularly 
methamphetamines, (ICG, 2019) and a continued crackdown on people who use drugs. 
Conservative estimates reveal that at least half of the people in Myanmar’s overflowing 
prison system are incarcerated for drug-related offences (Frontier Myanmar, 2019). Part of 
the reason for the continued focus on small-time users and dealers is that they are more 
accessible to Myanmar’s police force, who are able to extort money from the people they 
arrest, leaving these people in a perpetual cycle of arrest, incarceration and re-arrest 
(Jensema & Nang Pann Ei Kham, 2016). 
 
The other major reason is the inability (or unwillingness) to make any real headway into 
dismantling an illicit drugs production and trafficking industry that is deeply entangled in 
Myanmar’s complicated political situation between the central state and its many different 
regions, particularly the borderland regions of eastern Myanmar where drugs production is 
embedded. The military, along with a majority of the recognised ethnic organisations and 
their armed wings, often strongly deny involvement in drugs production and trafficking in 
Myanmar, despite the myriad historical accounts of their engagement in the trade 
(Buchanan, 2016; SHAN, 2016). Many of the country’s large ethnic armed organisations 
(EAOs) have sophisticated and extensive administrative structures covering an array of 
sectors including health, education and justice. A number of EAOs also have departments 
within them dedicated to tackling drug issues. For example, the Kachin Independence 
Organisation (KIO) established its Drug Eradication Committee in 1993. In 2010, the KIO 
declared drugs to be the Kachin people’s ‘principal and worst destructive enemy’. The KIO 
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Drug Eradication Committee was subsequently restructured and granted the authority to: 
 
1. Totally ban growing opium in KIO administrative areas. 
2. Check for drug trafficking, trading and storage, and take serious action. 
3. Send all drug users to drug eradication camps for proper medication. 
4. Provide capacity-building programmes (especially agriculture and livestock) for ex-
drug addicted people (Transnational Institute, 2012). 
 
The KIO Drug Eradication Committee has also conducted its own opium surveys across 
Kachin State and northern Shan State. The Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS) 
carries out an array of drug activities, including treatment centres, drug eradication, and 
drug seizures. In 2012 the RCSS established a dedicated Department of Drug Eradication 
to manage these activities, headed by Lt. Col. Sai Harn. This is often termed the RCSS 
Anti-Narcotics Committee.4  Numerous other armed groups, including the Palaung State 
Liberation Front/Ta-ang National Liberation Army, also appear to conduct regular anti-drug 
activities.5 These are often primarily focused on drug seizures. 
 
In these complex semi-autonomous borderland geographies, political and economic 
interests across a number of actors can merge with organised crime groups and create 
environments conducive to the production and trade of illicit drugs (Idris, 2019). One of the 
implications of increasing drugs production is the increasing availability and use of drugs by 
local populations. The health and social implications of drug use have been the stated 
reasons for efforts to push national drugs policy to be more focussed on reducing the health 
harms associated with drug use. In a policy sense, the push from a focus on criminalisation 
to health-based responses to drugs has been advocated for and strengthened by the 
growing sophistication and engagement of evidence-based drug policy advocates. Harm 
reduction programmes continue to expand into new geographies, mainly funded by 
international donors but approved by central authorities. These, together with the National 
AIDS Program under the Ministry of Health and Sports, are increasingly engaging in 
research activities to develop a Myanmar-relevant evidence base to support a continued 
health response to drug use. However, not all actors in Myanmar are supportive of a harm 
reduction approach, and zero tolerance to drug use remains normative among many 
communities. Examples of this include the ongoing efforts to build community-wide support 
for harm reduction programmes in Kachin State (MDM, 2019). Harm reduction programmes 
have been operating in parts of Kachin State for well over a decade but are not fully 




4 Details of the organisation’s activities can be found on the Department’s website: www.rcssanc.org/en/.  
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This section explores the nexus of drugs and health in Myanmar through a synthesis of the 
peer reviewed literature, the grey literature, and an analysis of major stakeholders who 
engage in the intersection of drugs and health. While illicit drugs production and its 
entanglement with conflict has been widely documented, there has been much less 
exploration of the dimensions of drugs and health in Myanmar. These dimensions include 
the role of illicit drug production in supporting household income and, by association, health 
and livelihoods, as well as the direct impact of drugs on individual and public health 
outcomes. The analysis briefly reviews the historical drugs and health literature before 
examining current dimensions of health and drugs, to inform possible opportunities for the 
Drugs & (dis)order project to engage with stakeholders across the drugs and health 
interface in Myanmar.  
 
It bears reminding that this section is set against a background where although there has 
been some reduction in opium production, drug production (particularly of 
methamphetamine) has continued to increase in Myanmar since the formal peace process 
was launched in 2011 (Karen Human Rights Group, 2014). This increase in drug production 
has been supported by the ongoing militarisation and organisation of a complex array of 
armed groups, who safeguard drug production through a range of power dynamics and 
relationships, and prosper financially from the drugs trade (Lahu National Development 
Organisation, 2016). Putting a perspective on the nexus of drugs and health in Myanmar is 
made more difficult by the overarching challenges to population health in Myanmar and the 
dysfunctional state of its health system. Many people living in the eastern Myanmar still do 
not have access to basic primary health care facilities and investment in health and the 
human resources for health in these areas is limited (Parmar et al., 2015). The ongoing 
sensitivities surrounding drug production and its economy in Myanmar limit the ability of 
local stakeholders such as health programmes operated by, or linked to, EAOs to develop a 




There is very little written in the peer-reviewed literature about the context of drugs and 
health prior to the early 1970s, when it became clear that the transition from opium 
cultivation to heroin production in Myanmar was resulting in an increase in the number of 
younger people being admitted to hospital with heroin addiction. Scholars suggest this 
transition to heroin use followed the changes to policy that banned the sale of opium in 
1965. Significant increases in levels of heroin addiction in the early 1970s, led to the 
adoption of the Narcotic and Dangerous Drugs Law, which applied severe penalties for 
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drug trafficking and punishment for people who used illicit narcotics (as discussed in 
Section 1) (Khant, 1985). The growing use of illicit drugs led to the establishment of the 
CCDAC in 1976, which oversees all issues related to drugs; in the context of drugs and 
health, this included the treatment and rehabilitation systems in Myanmar (see Section 1). 
CCDAC attempts to enact this authority through a range of established national sub-
committees and drug abuse control committees at regional/state, district, township, ward 
and village levels across Myanmar (Myanmar Country Report, 2019), although given the 
historical (and indeed current) lack of geographical reach of central government it is difficult 
to comment on this authority. 
 
Historically, through this diffused presence, CCDAC sought the active participation of the 
whole community in identifying people who used drugs who would then be registered for 
compulsory treatment. CCDAC established the first two large comprehensive centres in 
1982 to provide in-patient treatment for people considered drug addicts aged between 16 
and 40 years of age (Myanmar Country Report, 2019).6  
 
While the use of heroin was beginning to be considered a major health issue for the 
country, the use of opium was still considered to be a traditional medicine for many people 
in Myanmar, especially across many of the populations who occupied and moved across 
the mountains between Thailand and Myanmar. A 1978 exploration of opium use among hill 
tribes highlighted three main health-associated uses of opium: as a therapeutic drug, in 
response to illness and pain; as a psychoactive drug, in response to insomnia or acute 
stress or anxiety; and a drug for recreation (Suwanwela et al., 1978). 
 
The focus on the nexus of drugs and health in Myanmar sharpened significantly as HIV 
among people who injected drugs escalated in the late ‘80s and early ‘90s. In 1992, it was 
estimated that Myanmar had 160,000 people injecting drugs, and HIV prevalence estimates 
among this population varied from 50% to 85% (Gammelgaard, 1992). The expanding 
heroin production in northern Myanmar, the trafficking of heroin from the Golden Triangle 
across Southeast Asia and the transition to heroin injecting across the region meant that 
the drugs and health nexus in Myanmar had significant implications for the spread of HIV 
across the region (Beyrer et al., 2000). In response, the World Health Organization (WHO) 
placed injecting drug use and HIV in Asia on the agenda of a large regional meeting in 
Thailand in 1991, with the objective of preventing a transition towards drug injecting in 
countries in the region where drugs were still largely inhaled (Gammelgaard, 1992). While 
there was a significant need for health responses to injecting drugs and HIV, there was also 
an increasing body of literature suggesting that addressing the regional risk of HIV and drug 
use would require political solutions to the ongoing conflicts in Myanmar, in which drug 
production and trafficking were entangled (Ford, 1990). 
 
From 1991 onwards, HIV infection among people who inject drugs was the most referenced 
and predominant health and drug use narrative in Myanmar and the region (Sehgal, 1991; 
Gammelgaard, 1992). The issue did, however, continue to draw focus on significant human 
rights and security issues in the region that had their origins in Myanmar, such as human 
 
6 For more information see U Khant (1985). Measures to prevent and reduce drug abuse among young people in Burma. United Nations 
Office on Drugs and Crime: www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/bulletin/bulletin_1985-01-01_2_page012.html#f06.  
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trafficking and drug trafficking. In 1992, one study reported on the intersection of human 
trafficking, Burmese migrant fisherman, heroin and HIV through a study documenting the 
situation of Burmese women trafficked into prostitution in the Thai fishing town of Ranong 
(Lintner, 1999). Reportedly locked in brothels, the high rates of HIV among the women were 
attributed to the widespread heroin use among Burmese fisherman during lengthy periods 
at sea, who would then visit the brothels when they docked. The authors also documented 
the reported killing of female sex workers by the military government when they were 
returned to Myanmar from Ranong under the pretext of preventing the spread of HIV in 
Myanmar. 
 
By 1995, HIV infection rates among people injecting drugs in Myanmar were extraordinarily 
high, including 74% in Rangoon, 84% in Mandalay, and 91% in Myitkyina, which was the 
Kachin state capital located close to the Myanmar-China border (Beyrer et al., 2000). The 
identification of HIV among people who injected drugs in Yunnan Province, China, and its 
reported origins from Myanmar (AIDS Weekly, 1994), had already prompted a significant 
reaction from China, who announced they would implement a US$58 million dollar 
investment in a ‘disease prevention belt’ along the border with Vietnam, Laos and Burma. It 
was to combine health surveillance with security through the construction of numerous 
border posts established to prevent and respond to HIV and other infectious diseases 
(Tomlinson, 1996).  
 
Some seminal work into the links between narcotics production, trafficking and HIV across 
the Asia region has highlighted the spread of distinct subtypes of HIV along drug trafficking 
routes emerging out of different drug production areas in Myanmar, namely the Kokang hills 
of Shan State, the eastern Shan hills, the Wa Region and Kachin State (Beyrer et al. 2000). 
The authors concluded that single-country narcotics and HIV programmes were unlikely to 
succeed unless the regional narcotic-based economy was addressed. The authors 
recommended that increased information sharing across public health and narcotics control 
agencies in the region may assist both sectors to address issues of drug trafficking and HIV 
spread. 
 
By 2000 the diversification of drug production in Myanmar through the large-scale 
expansion of methamphetamine production was beginning to add a significant dimension to 
the drug and health nexus in the region. Multiple studies in Thailand began reporting the 
large increase in the use of methamphetamine by young Thais with an associated increase 
in the number of methamphetamine-related admissions to drug treatment centres in 
Thailand. While the widespread availability and use of methamphetamine among people in 
Myanmar was noted in several UNODC reports from 2005 to 2012, there is very limited 
health-orientated research that explores methamphetamine as a health issue in Myanmar. 
The research that does exist is largely focused on the use of methamphetamine among 
female sex workers in border areas along the Myanmar–China border (Hail-Jares , 2016), 
although there are also some large cross-sectional studies that highlight prevalent 
methamphetamine use among young people in Lashio. The UNODC estimates that there 
are up to 300,000 drug users in Myanmar.7 The 2017 Integrated Biological and Behavioural 
Survey estimated that there were 93,000 injecting drug users in Myanmar with a HIV 
 
7 See: www.unodc.org/docs/treatment/CoPro/Web_Myanmar.pdf.  
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infection rate of 21% among people who use drugs and 14% of people who use drugs who 
were HIV positive were on anti-retroviral therapy (Integrated Biological and Behavioural 
Survey, 2017). 
 
Interventions at the nexus of drugs and health 
 
This section explores the current mix of interventions at the nexus of drugs and health. It 
focuses on the health dimensions of a number of interventions enacted by a range of 
stakeholders in response to drugs in Myanmar, from drug production to drug treatment, 
harm reduction, and law enforcement. 
 
Drug production and health 
 
While the intersection of drugs production, eradication and alternative development is 
covered elsewhere in this paper, there are specific issues pertinent to this section on drugs 
and health. In 2006, the Palaung Women’s Organisation released a report exploring issues 
of the health and human rights impacts associated with the increased opium production in 
northern Shan State. The report describes how opium production collapsed other 
agricultural markets such as tea and how that in turn led to local farmers turning to opium 
growing or working in opium fields. This combination of events reportedly increased opium 
addiction among Palaung men, leading to a host of negative health and community 
outcomes (Paluang Women’s Organization, 2006). In contrast, the sudden implementation 
of major opium bans launched by the United Wa State Army (UWSA), Mongla and Kokang 
authorities had significant implications for health and livelihoods and placed upwards of 
90% of the population of some of these areas into food insecurity (von Lampe, 2010). In the 
context of alternative development, multiple reports highlight how rapid eradication in 
pursuit of alternative development has not allowed sufficient time for markets to develop. 
This has resulted in either an ongoing reliance on opium, or to food and economic 
insecurity, which has had negative implications on the health of communities. Some 
researchers have argued that this is especially pertinent when alternative development has 
not been accompanied by investments in – and access to – health or education for people 
affected by opium eradication programmes (Anderson, 2017).  
 
Drug treatment and health 
 
Prior to 2006, drug treatment mainly came in the form of compulsory and institutionalised 
detoxification for people considered dependent on opiates. In 2006, CCDAC, with the 
support of the WHO, approved the development and implementation of methadone 
maintenance therapy, with four centres initially set up in Yangon, Mandalay, Lashio and 
Myitkyina. However, the National AIDS Program’s 2014 Integrated Biological and 
Behavioural Survey estimated lifetime use of methadone was under 20% for people who 
injected drugs (National AIDS Program, 2014), indicating low coverage and difficult access 
to methadone therapy for many people who injected drugs in Myanmar. Since 2014, there 
have been significant efforts to integrate a range of HIV testing and treatment services 
through the methadone maintenance centres. The methadone programme has expanded 
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significantly, and the government now provides methadone maintenance treatment in 51 
health centres across the country. According to a 2017 annual report from the Drug 
Dependence and Treatment Research Unit (DDTRU), which oversees aspects of drug 
treatment on behalf of the Ministry of Health, a large majority of government-run drug 
detoxification and methadone maintenance centres are located in Sagaing, Kachin and 
northern Shan State (Drug Dependence and Treatment Research Unit, 2017). Yet, in 2018, 
it was estimated that methadone use among people who injected drugs was still about 20% 
(Tun et al. 2018). Methadone is not universally available across the country and its 
availability is dictated by the estimated number of people who inject drugs in an area. As a 
result, locations such as Taunggyi in Shan State do not have methadone availability as 
there is considered to be insufficient numbers of people who inject drugs residing there.  
 
In 2016, CCDAC devolved responsibility for drug treatment across two ministries – the 
Ministry of Health, which implements the detoxification and methadone maintenance 
programmes, and the Ministry of Social Welfare, Relief and Resettlement, which 
implements rehabilitation programmes for people who have been through the hospital-
based detoxification. The rehabilitation component is a six-week programme where 
participants receive counselling, sports, arts, meditation and vocational programming, 
although recent analysis suggested that these services are limited terms of quality and 
coverage, and in some cases are not operational at all (Jensema & Nang Pann Ei Kham, 
2016). The DDTRU has presided over recent reviews of methadone therapy and drug 
dependency treatment guidelines, as well as developing guidelines for the management of 
methamphetamine-use disorders in Myanmar. The methadone programme currently works 
in partnership with UN agencies, the National AIDS Program, and local and international 
non-government organisations.  
 
The DDTRU only reports on official national government sanctioned drug treatment, but 
there is a parallel informal approach to drug treatment run by some communities, 
particularly in ethnic states such as Kachin and Shan. In Kachin State, for example, the 
Kachin Baptist Convention created a ‘peoples war on drugs’ called the Pat Jasan 
movement, which has seen some community members deeply committed to eradicating 
drugs from Kachin State (Dan et al., 2021; Sadan et al., 2021). This has included efforts to 
eradicate poppy fields and forcing people who use drugs into community-supported drug 
detoxification centres (Government of Australia, 2019). These are often based on 
evangelical abstinence models, and do not meet the UN’s guidelines for health and 
evidence-based drug treatment (Lomethong and Walsh, 2019). There is some evidence of 
people who use drugs either being recruited into military training camps run by ethnic 
armed groups in Kachin and Shan states, or using the ethnic armies as places to spend 
time withdrawing from drugs (Child Soldiers International, 2014). 
 
Harm reduction  
 
Harm reduction programmes were approved in Myanmar in 2004 and have expanded 
significantly over the last 15 years. In 2009, the UN released technical guidance with nine 
core components, offering a comprehensive package of services for the prevention, 
treatment and care of HIV among people who inject drugs. This was adopted by the 
National AIDS Program of the Ministry of Health in Myanmar, which issued ‘National 
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Guidelines: A core package for HIV prevention amongst key populations in Myanmar' in 
2014 (Government of Myanmar, 2014). One component of the core package is the 
provision of harm reduction programmes, which provide both centre-based and outreach 
support to people who use drugs, including providing sterile needle and syringes. The 
programmes are run by local and international NGOs who work closely with government 
agencies in delivery. They are increasingly multi-component programmes that integrate HIV 
testing and treatment and act as gateways into methadone therapy. However, even with a 
government willing to support harm reduction services, the magnitude of the drug use 
problem is stretching programme capacity (UNAIDS, 2020). 
 
Although there is political will, and financial resources are available, implementing 
programmes in geographical areas where there is an urgent need remains an ongoing 
challenge. One of the major challenges remains the stigma and discrimination faced by 
people who use drugs and the resistance to harm reduction, especially needle–syringe 
programmes, at the local level from local populations and faith-based anti-narcotic drug 
groups such as those in Kachin State, who raise concerns about the role that syringe 
distribution plays in facilitating drug use (MDM, 2019). These concerns have been 
exacerbated by, sub-optimal implementation of harm reduction programmes, which has led 
to difficulty generating widespread community support. Despite these challenges, harm 
reduction implementers in Myanmar continue to drive innovative programmes designed to 
reach more areas and people in need, as well as remaining on the forefront of international 
harm reduction developments, such as the trialling of peer-based naloxone delivery to 
prevent and respond to opiate overdoses (EuroNPUD, 2019, 14-15). A Pre-exposure 
Prophylaxis (PrEP) trial among people who inject drugs is also set to commence in 2021 in 
Kachin State, and will involve key stakeholders from the National AIDS Program, the 
Department of Medical Research, USAID and their programme implementer Community 
Partners International (CPI), as well as harm reduction organisations such as the Asian 
Harm Reduction Network (AHRN). 
 
Criminalisation and the enabling environment to support service provision for people 
who use drugs 
 
In 2015, a Joint United Nations Programme on HIV and AIDS (UNAIDS) report suggested 
that the enabling environment for harm reduction was decreasing while a transition to 
democratic processes and freedom of expression was rising (UNAIDS, 2015). The 
suggestion was that long-held views, perceptions, discriminations and assumptions about 
drug use and people who use drugs were now being more openly expressed across 
Burmese society. Despite the legality of harm reduction and significant drug policy reforms 
supporting a health-based approach to drug use, there remains a significant criminalisation 
of people who use drugs, which has negative implications for health. Myanmar’s prisons are 
overcrowded with people who have used drugs who are sentenced to lengthy jail terms. 
Prisons have a very limited capacity to provide basic health needs for prisoners, and almost 
no capacity to deliver drug treatment programmes. In 2012, some efforts were made to 
explore and develop the role of the police as partners to HIV and harm reduction 
programmes through UNODC-supported training programmes, but these programmes have 
been limited by the lack of development partner support. While Myanmar’s national drug 
policy foregrounds health for people who use drugs and aims to ‘build safe and healthy 
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communities by minimizing health, social and economic harms’ there is a vast gap in the 
implementation of those policies by police on the ground, and arrest rates of people who 
use drugs remain very high (Tin Htet Paing, 2017).  There are currently significant attempts 
to address the community level environment in which health interventions to drug use 






8 More information available at: www.cpintl.org/usaid-hivaids-flagship-uhf-project.html.  
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While rich in natural resources such as water, minerals and forests, the UN estimated in 
2017 that 24% of Myanmar’s population live in poverty with a further 20% vulnerable to 
slipping into poverty (Myanmar Living Conditions Survey, 2017). Further, while poverty is 
concentrated in populations living in rural and mountainous areas such as many of the 
people living in Shan State (Mohanty et al., 2018),  increasing economic activity in 
expanding border towns on the Myanmar–China border has led to net migration to the 
border areas (Boutry, 2020). Part of the reason for this is that traditional western-led 
development aid in Myanmar, which focuses on poverty alleviation, education and health, is 
a relatively small component of a more complicated overall development. While aid 
commitments totalled US$13.7 billion in 2011–2015, foreign direct investment in the same 
period was approximately US$27.6 billion (Asia Foundation Report, 2018).  
 
Much of this foreign direct investment was channelled through large investments in 
resource extraction and infrastructure – particularly from borderlands and countries 
neighbouring Myanmar including China, India and Thailand or those in the wider region, 
such as Vietnam (Bissinger, 2012). To guide development assistance, the government of 
Myanmar released its Myanmar Sustainable Development Plan 2018–2030 (MSDP), which 
it framed to resonate with the world’s Sustainable Development Agenda (Government of 
Myanmar, 2018). Myanmar’s aid and development sector is, however, very much split 
across these two competing strategies: traditional, largely western-funded official 
development aid (ODA) programmes, and large-scale foreign direct investment, led by 
China and other neighbouring countries. Myanmar’s borderlands are a meeting place for 
these competing western and Chinese rural development models, and their differences are 
acutely highlighted in how they approach alternative development and livelihoods in the 
context of drugs. 
 
Western development practice in Myanmar delivers assistance through development 
programmes aimed at improving health, education, governance, and infrastructure, 
mitigating climate change, creating jobs, developing agriculture and aquaculture industries, 
supporting human rights and enhancing gender equity, to name some of the focus areas. 
However, in reviewing the MSDP and some of the associated donor strategies such as 
those from the Asian Development Bank and the World Bank, the words ‘drugs’, 
‘eradication’ or ‘alternative development’ are barely mentioned. Even donors such as 
Denmark, who explicitly describe a focus on livelihoods and food security as part of their 
rural development strategies, do not explicitly mention alternative development or drug 
production replacement programmes (Government of Denmark, 2015). In the context of 
western-led development practice in Myanmar, this indicates the persistent disconnect 
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between the traditional development agenda and the drug-related alternative development 
agenda in the context of drugs and development assistance in Myanmar. This disconnect is 
partially demonstrated by the delineation of stakeholders engaged in these differing 
‘development’ agendas, with UNODC largely assuming coordination of the western-
supported ‘alternative development’ portfolio of programmes, together with their national 
partners at the CCDAC. 
 
In 2017, the UNODC released a report looking at resilience to poppy farming in Shan State 
and the implications for alternative development, peace and stability. The study found that 
about one in ten villages of the 591 villages surveyed in Shan State were engaged in poppy 
cultivation, which was generally done in small plots of around 0.6 hectares. The report also 
highlighted some basic development indicators of villages who grew poppy versus those 
who did not. Villages who did not grow poppy were more likely to have greater access to 
asphalt roads and local markets, were more likely to own their land and were more likely to 
have access to a health clinic than villages who did grow poppy.   
Furthermore, poppy production was less likely to occur if the village perceived a level of 
peace, security and good governance (UNODC, 2017). The report, however, appears to 
justify the combination of legally enforced eradication and alternative development practices 
in response to drug issues, but only speaks of law enforcement enacted on opium farmers 
rather than those higher up the commodity chain. 
 
Furthermore, a potential contradiction underlying the report is that it acknowledges that 
‘poppy-growing villages’ are poorer, with fewer services and greater marginalisation – but 
the focus on the need for ‘developing’ these regions (to include alternative development, 
law enforcement, and service provision) underplays the role that poppy cultivation plays in 
helping households to alleviate poverty. This is mentioned in some places (e.g. opium 
revenue to pay for food etc.) but the sub-text of the messages coming out of this report 
seems to be that providing development to these regions can then justify a focus on drug 
eradication. This overlooks the fact that ‘development’ doesn’t benefit everyone equally or 
reach every area, and leaves a perpetual question at the drugs and development nexus: 
what to do about the role that opium plays in alleviating poverty?  
 
A brief history of alternative development in 
Myanmar 
 
In 1976 a Bulletin of Narcotics article described early efforts to transition ‘semi-nomadic’ 
ethnic peoples inhabiting the Golden Triangle away from the single crop dependence on 
opium despite opium meeting all of their needs for the livelihoods of their families. The 
theory was that by force of example and some investment in agricultural research there 
would be a net cumulative effect to transition people from single cropping to mixed farming 
methods. Noting the enormity of the challenge, the article cited the geographical difficulties 
in accessing these areas and the centuries-old dependence on opium cropping (Nepote, 
1976). Since these initial beginnings, ‘alternative development’ in northern Myanmar has 
become complicated by the range of different actors involved and the motives and ways of 
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implementing these programmes.  
 
Although complicated and difficult to delineate in some ways, there have been a few 
differing approaches to the spectrum of work collectively and generally now known as 
‘alternative development’, which in many ways is a catch-all phrase that encompasses rural 
development, opium eradication and poverty alleviation. The UNODC has helped facilitate a 
large portion of these approaches, which take in the bilateral efforts of European, US, Thai 
and Japanese partners. Over the decades, the UN and its partners have increasingly 
sought to place engagement with local communities and support for their livelihoods at the 
centre of programme design, although this has evolved over time in line with development 
practices of community inclusion. However, these programmes only operate with the 
permission from the government and the activities of these programmes in drug-producing 
areas are subject to close government monitoring. 
 
The majority of alternative development programmes have been targeted in southern and 
eastern Shan State, where most of the country’s opium is produced. The complexities 
inherent in reducing dependence on opium production through alternative development 
were really highlighted through the UNODC/Wa project that began in 1997–98, established 
to work with the Wa authorities to support their stated desire to be opium-production free by 
2005. An evaluation report of the project noted that the ‘Project objective was to establish a 
sustainable, community-based approach to the reduction and eventual elimination of supply 
and demand for opium in the Wa Region’. The project was assigned an initial budget of 
US$15,492,075. 
 
Given the relative lack of presence of the government of Myanmar in the Special Wa 
Autonomous Regions, which persists to this day due to agreements reached between the 
United Wa State Army (UWSA) and the Tatmadaw in the 1989 ceasefire, the UNODC 
found itself working closely with the Wa authorities and largely in isolation from the central 
government in the implementation of the programme (Renard et al. 2003). While project 
activities were originally linked to opium eradication, the project evolved over time with 
some commentators suggesting that the Wa authorities used the project to essentially 
engage in state building in relation to infrastructure such as roads. Large numbers of people 
were moved from mountainous areas to more fertile valleys suited to rice production, which 
became a large focus of the project. This was driven by the recognition that without opium 
to trade, many subsistence farmers would face food insecurity – which they duly did – and 
the World Food Program (WFP) ended up having to provide emergency food aid due to the 
near starvation caused by the opium bans. Furthermore, widespread opium bans and 
heavy enforcement across the Wa, Kokang and Mongla geographies only contributed to 
further food insecurity in many areas outside of the Wa/UNODC project’s remit as well.  
Since 2012, the largest donors to UNODC’s attempts to promote alternative development 
have been Finland and Germany, who initially contributed resources to support the 
development of alternative agricultural crops in opium-growing regions of Shan State. 
Cultivating an estimated 600 hectares of land formerly used for opium cultivation in 
Hopong, near Taunggyi, these efforts have largely supported coffee planting since around 
2014, with coffee seen as a high value and sustainable cash crop. In 2015, with the support 
of an expert in establishing community cooperatives, and through an agreement with the 
national government’s Ministry for Cooperatives, community members from over 40 villages 
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in the surrounding area involved in the coffee project formed the Green Gold Coffee 
Cooperative (UNODC, 2015). In 2018, the Finnish and German governments extended 
their support for the UNODC project for an additional four years, with a 6.1-million-euro 
contribution (UNODC, 2018). The UNODC were aware that such a small project would not 
dent Myanmar’s opium harvest but envisaged that the ‘boutique’ project would show that 
such schemes could be successful as a way to attract further funding and government 
support. 
 
In 2013 – and in parallel to the Green Gold coffee project – USAID’s Value Chains for Rural 
Development in Burma programme contracted a US-based international development 
contractor called Winrock to support communities in Myanmar to grow coffee. The model 
was aimed at producing better quality coffee beans than the Green Gold coffee beans, for 
sale into higher value international coffee markets. The project was accused of luring 
people away from the UNODC project cooperative, which Winrock denied despite a photo 
shoot of the US ambassador planting a coffee plant in the same geography as the UNODC 
Hopong Coffee project (Guckelsberger, 2019).  Winrock pursued a different model to the 
UNODC coffee substitution programme by focusing on supporting farmers to produce 
specialty coffee rather than producing for the mass coffee market, in which they argued 
Myanmar farmers would struggle to compete. The Winrock project drew to a close at the 
end of 2019, but claims to have supported thousands of smallholder farmers to engage in 
the nascent coffee industry in Myanmar.9 Independent observers note that while the coffee 
export industry has grown in Myanmar, much of the coffee is not being sold into high-end 
markets but ending up being traded on the Chinese border for substantially lower prices 
that would be available on the open international markets (International Growth Centre, 
2019). 
 
China and its opium replacement programme 
 
In response to the threat of opium production in Myanmar and its implications for heroin 
trafficking and use in China, the Chinese government has engaged in an opium 
replacement programme in Shan State that some authors argue is driven by both 
geopolitical and geo-economic reasons, and an ongoing desire by China to assert itself in 
the border areas between itself and Myanmar (Su and Lim, 2019). Since around 2006, 
China has implemented a form of alternative development through its Opium Replacement 
Programme (ORP). This scheme supports Chinese companies to invest in northern 
Myanmar and Laos, with a particular focus on large-scale agriculture, especially rubber 
plantations. 
 
By participating in the ORP, Chinese companies are able to obtain much-coveted licenses 
to import agricultural products into to China (subject to quotas), as well as exemptions from 
tariffs and import VAT (TNI, 2012; Shi, 2008; Su, 2015). As of 2015, more than 200 
Chinese companies had participated in the scheme and were responsible for agricultural 
 
9 See: https://winrock.org/an-early-adopter-in-myanmar/.  
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plantations on more than 200,000 hectares of land in Myanmar and northern Laos, a figure 
that far surpasses the amount of land actually under poppy cultivation (Su, 2015, 79).  
 
China’s market-oriented approach does not provide direct support to opium cultivators to 
grow other licit crops and in this way it differs from western models of alternative 
development. Rather, it aims to reduce opium cultivation as part of a wider strategy of 
borderland development focused on agribusiness expansion, infrastructure, and state 
consolidation in border areas (Lu, 2017). This logic behind this strategy is that it will 
facilitate sustained economic growth and create new employment opportunities in the legal 
economy that will alleviate poverty and draw people away from illicit opium cultivation. 
 
Although the narrative of counter narcotics has been long used by various actors to engage 
in the borderlands of Myanmar, it is clear from the actions of many of the Yunnan 
companies that the ORP had very little to do with reducing levels of opium production. They 
saw the ORP as an opportunity – the scheme offered highly sought-after licenses to import 
foodstuffs into Chinese markets and various forms of subsidies and tax breaks. It also 
became a way of lobbying the Chinese state to relax border restrictions and to open up 
Myanmar’s borders to Chinese investment. These companies have little interest in opium 
substitution – the land they now farm on far exceeds the amount of land used for poppy 
cultivation, and most investments have been targeted in areas of lower elevation and have 
in fact intensified competition for land and resources in Myanmar’s borderlands.  
 
While rubber production has in many ways been linked with the Chinese ORP, it has also 
been driven by the government of Myanmar’s Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation’s 30-year 
master plan (2000–2030), which aims to promote large-scale estate mono agriculture 
production, especially rubber. This vision has been supported by long-standing national 
legislation under the Land Acquisition Act of 1894, whereby land could be forcibly acquired 
in the national interest (Kenney-Lazar, 2016). As of 2018, more than a million hectares of 
land along the border had been acquired for agribusiness ventures by Chinese investors, 
ironically forcing many small landholders off their land and back into the production of 
opium poppies as a food security and economic survival response (Woods, 2018b; Meehan 
2021).  
 
The opium survey and alternative development 
 
The annual opium survey is a collaboration between UNODC and CCDAC, and is a crucial 
tool to support the design and implementation of alternative development programmes 
(UNODC, 2019). In 1996, the total area under opium poppy cultivation in Myanmar was 
estimated at over 160,000 hectares, mainly concentrated in Shan State. By 2019, the 
UNODC estimated that the total area under cultivation was 33,100 hectares. Since 1996, 
there has been a steady decline in areas under poppy cultivation, reaching a low of just 
over 20,000 hectares in 2006, which was driven by a series of opium bans in eastern Shan 
State implemented in Mongla since 1997, the Kokang region since 2003 and in Wa State 
since 2005 (TNI, 2005). From 2007 to 2014, there were incremental year on increases in 
production to a high of 60,000 hectares in 2014. Since 2014 the annual opium surveys 
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report a gradual fall in levels of cultivation. Although 85% of opium production is still 
estimated to occur in Shan State, the 2019 estimate noted small decreases in areas across 
Shan State from the previous year, but a 15% increase in production in Kachin State.  
However, the politics surrounding the analysis conducted in the opium survey are 
significant. In response to the 2018 survey, several ethnic armed organisations criticised 
many of the assertions that opium was being produced in territories controlled by ethnic 
armed groups, and instead made counter claims that opium production was concentrated in 




Thailand first began to blend opium eradication with alternative development in 1969 inside 
its borders with the Golden Triangle. The programme, which became known as the Royal 
Project, has long been heralded for its ability to eradicate opium and work with communities 
to transition away from opium growing and into alternative crops and other forms of 
agricultural production. The key to the success of the programme has been put down to its 
long-term resourcing, which has often meant underwriting and subsidising the replacement 
agricultural products so farmers can benefit from a degree of certainty along the production 
to sale spectrum. These efforts, however, were also partnered with significant law 
enforcement strategies that included the use of satellite imagery, aerial surveillance and on-
the-ground eradication of poppies. Between 1984 and 2004, the programme resulted in a 
reduction of opium production on Thai soil from 8000 hectares to 200 hectares 
(Aramrattana and Pitaya, 2006). Perhaps the real key to the success of the programme in 
Thailand was the shift of opium production from Thailand into Shan State that resulted from 
the Thai law enforcement efforts, as demand for opium in Thailand did not substantially 
alter. The Thai example is often held up as the gold standard in how to sustain long-term 
transitions away from opium growing, but the reality is that these efforts in Thailand remain 
heavily subsidised. 
 
Critics of alternative development in Myanmar argue that it has been significantly under-
resourced and has only been capable of reducing short-term food shortages for some 
communities where programmes have been enacted. UNODC’s capacity to scale is also 
limited by its relatively low presence in Myanmar compared to, say, Colombia. Yet the 
ability to scale and sustain alternative development in Myanmar is also limited by the 
complicated geography and the long-term involvement of illicit drugs in the economies, 
livelihoods and power dynamics in contested areas of Myanmar. Given the vast 
development needs of Myanmar and the political obstacles to meeting the development 
needs, including seeing an end to armed conflict and a genuine attempt at sharing the 
benefits of the vast natural resources across the population in Myanmar, alternative 
development as a response to opium production will not in itself be successful.   
 
The Myanmar Opium Farmers’ Forum was established in 2013 to give voice to smallholder 
opium poppy farmers. Seven years on they describe a series of challenges that many of 
them have spent decades living with: the lack of access to markets, the inability to make 
enough resources from alternative crops, the persistent presence of conflict, dispossession 
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of land, the role of opium in their livelihood, culture and medicinal practices, and their lack 
of agency in policy debates surrounding opium production and eradication (Statement from 
the 7th Myanmar Opium Farmers' Forum, 2019). Ultimately the scale of alternative 
development and development in general has not been sufficient to see livelihood gains for 
the thousands of people involved in small-scale poppy production and forcing opium 
eradication without first ensuring livelihoods are protected is doomed to fail (Felbab-Brown, 
2017).  
 
Since the 1990s, Myanmar’s borderlands have been increasingly integrated into regional 
economies and global commodity chains. The significance and impact of western-led rural 
development programmes is much smaller than the wider processes of rapid agrarian 
change, which are driven by inflows of foreign direct investment that in turn increase 
competition for land and resources. As a result, and contrary to the premises of alternative 
development, drug cultivation is not something confined to marginalised areas ‘left out’ of 
development. It is also a response to populations facing worsening livelihood insecurity as a 
result of wider development processes and borderland development interventions – 
something entirely ignored in current policy debates on drugs and development (Meehan, 
2021; Woods, 2020). This challenges the narrative that drug use and production are caused 
by marginality/lack of development and requires a more critical focus on forms of 
‘immiserating development’ in which the poorest hardly benefit. 
 
The other major gap in the literature is that there has been almost no research at all on how 
drug use affects rural livelihoods. The focus on drug issues and development remains 
entirely around production, despite the high levels of concern among rural populations 
regarding worsening drug-related harms and the fact that drug use is now deeply 
embedded in rural economies, especially around labour practices. This includes drug use 
being linked to increased productivity in labour-intensive jobs, payment for labour in drugs, 
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6. Drugs and peacebuilding in Myanmar 
 
The following section analyses Myanmar’s peace process, since its launch in 2011 and 
prior to the recent February 2021 coup, and the intersections between peacebuilding and 
drug issues. It provides a brief overview of how the peace process has been structured, key 
events and turning points, and the extent of international engagement, before assessing the 
extent to which drug issues have been incorporated into the formal peace process and 
wider peacebuilding efforts. 
 
The peace process in Myanmar since 2011  
 
In November 2010, Myanmar held its first general election for 20 years. The election was 
boycotted by the National League for Democracy (NLD), the country’s largest opposition 
movement, as well as a number of other political parties, notably the Shan Nationalities 
League for Democracy, which had been the second largest party in 1990. The army-backed 
Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) won a landslide victory and Thein Sein, a 
former army regional commander, became the country’s president. As per the 2008 
constitution, 25% of all seats in both the upper and lower houses were reserved for military 
nominations. Following the election, Thein Sein’s USDP government announced a range of 
political and economic reforms, and in August 2011 the government invited the country’s 
armed groups ‘to secure lasting peace’. This marked the first official nationwide peace 
overture since 1963.  
 
However, the launch of the country’s formal peace process coincided with some of the 
worst fighting in the country’s borderlands for more than 25 years, concentrated in Kachin 
State and northern Shan State. New insurgencies have since emerged, internally displaced 
persons now number in the hundreds of thousands, and there are continued reports of 
systematic abuses and human rights violations in conflict-affected areas. 
 
Much external engagement with Myanmar’s peace process was based upon the 
assumption that opening up political space at the centre – through supporting the country’s 
democratic transition, Aung San Suu Kyi, and the national-level peace process – would 
provide the foundations for peacebuilding throughout the country’s borderlands. However, 
this approach failed to account for how the same dynamics that facilitated the launching of 
the peace process at the national level – especially the Myanmar military’s belief that they 
were in a strong enough position to manage this process on their own terms – constrained 
opportunities to address the drivers of conflict in Kachin and northern Shan State.  
 
Decades of armed conflict had created complex and fragmented dynamics across the 
country’s borderlands with around 20 active EAOs of varying size, territorial reach and with 
different relations to the government. Some organisations had longstanding ceasefires, for 
others, ceasefires had recently broken down, while in some cases there was no history of 
previous ceasefires arrangements. The government initially sought to establish bilateral 
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ceasefire arrangements with armed organisations and then shifted focus towards reaching 
a nationwide ceasefire agreement (NCA). However, the worsening armed conflict in 
northern Shan State and Kachin State and the recent history of ceasefires that never led to 
meaningful political dialogue meant that progress towards the NCA was slow. Eight EAOs 
did eventually sign the NCA in October 2015. Two large EAOs – the RCSS and the KNU – 
signed the NCA with the remaining six signatories being small armed groups. The majority 
of those that signed the NCA are based close to the Thai border across Shan and Karen 
State – areas where ceasefires in the 1990s and 2000s had been largely absent. The NCA 
thus helped to cement a fragile stability along the Thai border that had emerged since the 
bilateral ceasefires agreed with the KNU and RCSS in 2011/2012. In contrast, many of the 
country’s largest EAOs, most of which are based close to the China border in eastern and 
northern Shan State and Kachin State, refused to sign. Although some groups maintained 
bilateral ceasefires with the government, violent conflict has continued across much of this 
region throughout the formal peace process, after years of fragile stability under the 
previous ceasefire arrangements.   
 
Overview of the nationwide ceasefire agreement (NCA) 
The NCA is a 12-page document that was signed between the Myanmar government 
and ten EAOs in October 2015. Two further EAOs signed the agreement in February 
2018. Some of the core parts of the NCA are outlined below: 
 
Basic principles 
All signatories recognise the territorial integrity of the state and to ‘establish a union 
based on the principles of democracy and federalism’, embracing diversity in a 
‘secular state’.  
 
*This is the NCA’s only mention of federalism. EAOs had wanted the inclusion of the 
phrase ‘establishing a federal union based on ethnic national states’ and a 




The NCA established a ‘Joint Ceasefire Monitoring Committee’. This Committee has 
become known as the JMC. It contains 10 representatives of the NCA-signatory 
armed groups, ten government representatives (including Myanmar military) and four 
independent civilians. There are also sub-national JMCs at both the state level and 
local level. 
 
Military code of contact 
All signatories agreed to abide by a ‘military code of conduct’. This prohibits certain 
military activities including attacks, further recruitment, landmines, and establishing 
new bases. There are also vague provisions about monitoring troop deployment and 
troop movements. The NCA also provides a commitment to protect civilians and 
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There is agreement to ‘begin an inclusive political dialogue process … with an aim of 
achieving just and sustainable peace’, and to establish a Union Peace Dialogue Joint 
Committee (UPDJC). The NCA sets out a seven-stage roadmap: 
1. Signing the NCA 
2. Drafting and adopting the ‘Framework for Political Dialogue’ to be led by the 
UPDJC 
3. Holding national political dialogue 
4. Holding a Union Peace Conference 
5. Signing of peace accord 
6. Ratification of the peace accord by parliament 
7. Implementation of the peace accord. 
 
Interim arrangements 
In the period between signing the NCA and completing the political roadmap, the 
NCA sets out certain tasks to be implemented in the ‘interim period’. The NCA allows 
armed groups to exercise authority in their areas of control in relation to security, 
development, services, environment conservation and cultural promotion. All NCA 
signatories are also removed from the government’s list of unlawful associations and 
are allowed to receive aid from Myanmar and international donors for regional 
development and capacity-building projects.  
 
Aung San Suu Kyi’s landslide election victory in the 2015 general election created renewed 
hopes and levels of international support for the country’s reforms and peace process. Suu 
Kyi stated that achieving peace was her government’s first priority and that she would 
personally lead the process to ‘build up a genuine, federal democratic union’. However, the 
peace process has made little progress over the past five years. No new large EAOs have 
signed the NCA, armed conflict continues in many of the country’s ethnic states, especially 
in Rakhine State, Kachin State and Shan State, and political dialogue has made scant 
progress has been made on addressing many of the more intractable challenges underlying 
the country’s myriad conflicts. The February 2021 military coup has marked the final 
collapse of the peace process. However, even in the years prior to the coup the peace 
process had been moribund as it struggled to overcome a series of difficulties, some a 
legacy that Suu Kyi’s government inherited, others exacerbated by the new NLD 
government:   
 
1. The NLD government inherited a complex and stagnating peace process: the 
NLD effectively inherited a triple-track peace process: (i) advancing the NCA process 
by embarking on the political roadmap with NCA signatories; (ii) efforts to convince 
non-signatories to join the NCA and political dialogue; and (iii) addressing the 
ongoing armed conflict in northern Shan State and Kachin State.    
 
2. Tensions at the heart of government between the NLD and the Myanmar 
military: Under President Thein Sein, the government negotiation team effectively 
comprised both civilian and military wings. Under the NLD, there was now a 
disconnect between peace negotiations led by the NLD and by Suu Kyi personally, 
and the Myanmar military who remained the de facto authority that EAOs had to deal 
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with on the ground.  
 
3. Weak capacity within the NLD: Serious questions have been raised regarding the 
capacity of the government’s National Reconciliation and Peace Centre to lead the 
peace negotiations, epitomised by Aung San Suu Kyi’s decision to appoint her 
personal physician as chief negotiator. Under Suu Kyi, government peace 
negotiations increasingly prioritised formal talks over informal dialogue, shutting off 
some of the ways in which relations between the government and EAOs had been 
built under the Thein Sein government.  
 
4. Aung San Suu Kyi’s miscalculation in her own moral authority as a mediator: 
Aung San Suu Kyi appeared to view herself and the NLD as a neutral force between 
the military and EAOs. However, this proved to be ‘a fundamental misreading of how 
many ethnic minorities perceive the party and government more broadly, dominated 
as they are by ethnic Burmans’ (International Crisis Group, 2020). Aung San Suu 
Kyi’s praise of the military, her high-handed and haughty manner, and the 
government’s failure to address ethnic grievances hardened attitudes against her 
government amongst EAOs.  
 
5. Fragility of the NCA: The mechanisms set out in the NCA to mitigate conflict, 
facilitate political dialogue and to deliver a ceasefire dividend through the ‘interim 
arrangements’ soon proved weak and became an issue of increasing frustration and 
resentment rather than a platform for trust building.  
 
6. The NLD’s waning interest in the peace process: The NLD’s fundamental priority 
since taking office has been to change the country’s constitution and thus dismantle 
the military’s entrenched control over the political system. Part of the initial 
prioritisation given by the NLD to the peace process was seemingly linked to its 
belief that the political roadmap set out by the NCA would provide a means through 
which to pursue constitutional change. However, as the peace process stalled and 
the complexity of reaching a peace settlement became apparent, the NLD shifted 
tactics, seeking (and failing) to instigate constitutional change instead through 
parliament, and prioritising other goals. Momentum on the peace process began to 
dwindle. 
 
7. The Rohingya crisis: The profound violence enacted by the Myanmar military in 
2017 against the country’s Rohingya population in Rakhine State caused widespread 
international outcry. Aung San Suu Kyi’s subsequent refusal to provide a strong lead 
in condemning the violence caused further international outcry. The subsequent 
escalation in armed conflict across Rakhine State and rising tensions between the 
government and international actors has created further challenges to the country’s 
peace process.  
 
By 2017 the peace process had clearly stalled and had ‘entered a phase of crises, deadlock 
and setbacks’ (Burma News International, 2018). In April 2017, seven EAOs that had not 
signed the NCA formed the Federal Political Negotiation and Consultative Committee 
(FPNCC) to advocate for an alternative approach to the NCA. The peace process faced a 
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further crisis in May 2019 when the two largest EAOs that had signed the NCA – the KNU 
and the RCSS – announced they were suspending their participation in peace negotiations, 
citing the lack of progress, a loss of trust in the government, and worsening clashes with the 
Myanmar Army.  
 
In August 2020, the government convened the much delayed fourth session of Union 
Peace Conference-21st Century Panglong. The conference concluded with delegates 
signing the Union Accord III.10 This comprised agreement on 15 points under the framework 
agreement on implementing the NCA, a vague and broad agreement on next steps 
following the 2020 general election, and agreement on five ‘Fundamental Principles to 
Establish a Union based on Democracy and a Federal System’. It is notable that no FPNCC 
members attended the latest Union Peace Conference (21st Century Panglong) in August 
2020. The peace then entered a period of hiatus due to the country’s 2020 General 
Election. Any hopes that the new NLD government would be able to reinvigorate the peace 
process were dashed by the military coup in February 2021. In the months that have 
followed, the military has deployed brutal violence as part of efforts to stamp out 
widespread opposition. The coup has also exacerbated tensions with EAOs and in the 
months since the coup there have been renewed outbreaks of violence throughout the 
country’s conflict-affected borderlands. The coup is seen by many of the EAOs as 
vindicating their scepticism in the post-2010 political system and their distrust in the 
Myanmar military’s motivations surrounding the peace process. 
 
International involvement in the peace process 
 
Myanmar’s peace process was home-grown and the government strongly resisted formal 
involvement of international mediators. There was no form of international monitoring, 
peacekeeping forces, or post-conflict reconstruction. The government’s decision to embark 
upon a period of political and economic reforms since 2010 (including the peace process) 
was underpinned by a belief that it was now in a strong enough position to manage such a 
transition on its own terms. Central to this was a strong view amongst political and military 
elites of the need to insulate the country from the disruptive influence of external – 
especially western – intervention. This sentiment has grown stronger following the 
international condemnation of the government’s treatment of the country’s Rohingya 
population. 
 
It is also important to acknowledge the fact that development aid remains a small 
component of Myanmar’s national budget. According to data compiled by the Asia 
Foundation between 2011 and 2016, aid accounted for approximately 4–6% of the national 
budget. This is substantially lower than neighbouring low-income countries such as Laos 
(21.2%), Cambodia (32.3%), and other countries involved in this Global Challenges 
Research Fund (GCRF) research, such as Afghanistan (more than 60%). Remittance flows 
provide a similar value to aid and foreign direct investment is more than double aid flows. 
Of the total aid that was pledged to Myanmar between 2011 and 2016, only a small amount 
 
10 The Union Accord III text is accessible here: www.nrpc.gov.mm/en/node/470.  
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– 1.3% to 3% – has been directed to support the peace process (Asia Foundation Report, 
2018). More than 80% of this funding has been routed through national projects, largely to 
support multi-donor peace funds and national level research and advisory programmes.  
 
As a consequence of these factors, international mediation in the peace process has been 
limited, especially among western powers. China is the most important external actor and 
holds significant influence with both the government and the country’s most powerful EAOs, 
most of which operate along its borders and some of which have longstanding historical 
and cultural ties with China. Relations with the Thein Sein government became tense 
following the government’s decision to suspend the Myitsone Dam project, the spillover of 
violence and refugees following Myanmar Army offensives along the border, and concerns 
regarding increasing US influence. Under Aung San Suu Kyi, China has taken a more overt 
role in the peace process. Partly this is because Suu Kyi sought to improve the bilateral 
relationship with China, while the souring of relations with western powers following the 
Rohingya crisis has enabled China to once again become Myanmar’s pre-eminent defender 
within the UN. The armed conflict in northern Shan State is also concentrated in a highly 
strategic region for the China–Myanmar Economic Corridor, which forms a key component 
of the Belt and Road Initiative. Stability in this region appears to be China’s primary concern 
and while it is supportive of the country’s peace process, it has positioned itself as a 
facilitator rather than a mediator and has avoided attempts to push the peace process or 
set the agenda. China’s powerful influence with the Myanmar government has also played 
an important role in limiting the influence of the US and other western powers in the peace 
process. As the Myanmar scholar, Thant Myint-U, has surmised of China’s approach, 
‘fighting was bad, but the wrong kind of peace could be worse’ (Thant Myint-U, 2020). It is 
also important to note that China is not a monolithic actor, and there are tensions and 
differing priorities for engagement between central government and provincial elites in 
Yunnan, with the latter keen to prioritise maintaining trade and investment opportunities 
despite ongoing armed conflict.   
 
Amongst western actors, Norway initially played the most prominent role in trying to support 
the peace process. It led the Myanmar Peace Support Initiative (MPSI) that was headed by 
Charles Petrie and operated between 2012 and 2014. The MPSI aimed to support – and 
test the resilience of – the country’s ceasefire process by supporting an array of small-scale 
projects in conflict-affected areas that were designed to build trust and confidence around 
the peace process and deliver peace dividends in ceasefire areas.11 Norway also founded 
the Peace Donors Support Group, out of which grew the Joint Peace Fund. The latter has 
11 donors: Australia, Canada, Denmark, the European Union, Finland, Germany, Italy, 
Norway, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. It provides pooled 
funding to support the peace process with a budget of approximately €100 million and is 
expected to operate until at least 2021. 
 
Although external actors have had limited influence over the formal peace process 
negotiations, numerous governments and multilateral donors funded a wider array of 
peacebuilding activities. These have included: (i) support to facilitate the negotiations (e.g. 
advice to government and EAOs, financing the Myanmar Peace Centre); (ii) funding to 
 
11 For a detailed overview of MPSI’s work see: www.mmpeacemonitor.org/1444.  
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support the implementation and monitoring of the NCA (e.g. funding to support the JMCs); 
(iii) conflict analysis, often aimed at improving the conflict sensitivity of foreign direct 
investment and wider development interventions; (iv) initiatives to promote wider civil 
society dialogue, inclusivity (especially among women, youth, and marginalised groups), 
trust, and understanding surrounding the peace process. Section 5.4 provides an overview 
of some of the key actors and programmes that have aimed to support wider peacebuilding 
efforts.  
 
Drugs and peacebuilding  
 
The fact that all sides of the conflict are in some way linked to the drug trade has 
discouraged efforts to confront this issue beyond broad and banal statements. The decades 
prior to the 2011 peace process saw an ongoing blame game between the government and 
EAOs over who was responsible for the country’s drug trade. In light of the fragility of the 
peace process, priority was given to trying to maintain momentum rather than adding 
further challenges to the agenda. Thus, there remained a vast disconnect between 
concerns of borderland populations on drug issues and the potential for the peace process 
to address these concerns. The information below highlights the limited ways in which drug 
issues were brought into formal peace dialogue. It also assesses failed efforts to use joint 
counter-narcotics programmes, as a way to build trust between the Myanmar Army and the 
EAOs. It then draws attention to the continued politicisation of narratives surrounding drugs 
and the challenges this has posed to engaging with drug issues. 
 
Drugs and formal peace process 
 
The NCA: The 2015 NCA makes one mention of drugs: 
 
24  
a.  The Ethnic Armed Organizations that are signatories to this agreement have 
been responsible in their relevant capacities, for development and security in their 
respective areas. During the period of signing ceasefire and political dialogue, we 
shall carry out the following programmes and projects in coordination with each 
other in said areas.  
  … 
(6) Eradication of illicit drugs 
… 
c.  The government and the individual the Ethnic Armed Organizations shall 
coordinate the implementation of tasks that are specific to the areas of the 
respective Ethnic Armed Organization. 
 
The fact that drug eradication was placed under the NCA section on interim arrangements 
appears to frame drug issues as being specific to areas under EAO control. However, this 
issue has not raised significant debate or discussion. This is perhaps unsurprising in light of 
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Drugs in the Union Peace Conferences and Union Accords: Since 2016, the NLD 
government convened a series of peace conferences, termed Union Peace Conferences – 
21st Century Panglong, in an attempt to facilitate political dialogue. Four such conferences 
were held: in August/September 2016, May 2017, July 2018 and August 2020. The latter 
three conferences resulted in agreement on various points comprising Parts I, II, and III of 
an ongoing ‘Union Accord’. Drug issues are mentioned in Parts I and II of the Union Accord:  
 
Union Accord, Part I, Social Sector Agreement (29 May 2017): 
 
(4) To prevent and fight against the drug trafficking by laying the plan and 
implementing it considering the task a national issue pertaining to politics, security 
and rule of law.12  
 
Union Accord, Part II, Addendum (c) Social Sector basic principle agreement (16 
July 2018) 
 
6. Establish and conduct effective policies against harm reduction, treatment and 
reintegration of drugs and psychotropic substance usage13 
 
However, in light of the wider sets of challenges that faced the peace process, little 
progress had been made on addressing these issues.  
 
Failed engagement on drug issues amidst the peace process: The tripartite 
agreement between the RCSS, the Myanmar government and the UNODC 
 
One of the only instances where concerted efforts were made to engage with drug issues 
alongside peacebuilding came early in Myanmar’s peace process. Following the state-level 
ceasefire between the Thein Sein government and the Restoration Council of Shan State 
(RCSS) in December 2011, the UNODC brokered an agreement between the government 
and RCSS to co-operate on alternative development projects in the townships of Mong Nai 
and Mong Pan in southern Shan State. The plan was to conduct a joint needs assessment 
followed by crop-substitution pilot projects before scaling these up to a wider region. The 
UNODC was to be responsible for providing technical assistance and securing funding from 
international donors. The agreement also provided the RCSS with responsibility to run 
drug-awareness campaigns among local populations. However, the project never 
materialised. According to an official statement released by the RCSS,14 long delays were 
followed by the Myanmar government CCDAC’s refusal to engage with the RCSS. This was 
followed by attempts from another government wing – the Military Affairs Security – to 
actively block RCSS involvement in the joint needs-assessment. The final straw appeared 
to be the failure of the government to inform or invite the RCSS to a visit of the US and EU 
ambassadors to the proposed alternative development sites in December 2013 arranged by 
the UNODC.  
 
12 The text of the Union Accord Part I is accessible here: www.nrpc.gov.mm/en/node/226. 
13 The text of the Union Accord Part II is accessible here: www.nrpc.gov.mm/en/node/225. 




Understanding the drugs policy landscape in Myanmar  
 
Another major reason for the failure of the project was the lack of agreement regarding 
security arrangements in the proposed project areas. The nine-point agreement brokered 
by the UNODC acknowledged that security issues in the project areas would be presented 
to higher authorities and that the RCSS had requested that security in these areas would be 
the joint responsibility of the RCSS and the government. However, the government rejected 
this proposal, stipulating that the RCSS would be unable to carry weapons in these areas.  
 
The UNODC had hailed the initiative as a new, multi-million-dollar peace initiative 
scheduled for 2014–2017. However, by early 2014 the project had collapsed. Subsequent 
renewed armed conflict between the Myanmar military and the RCSS (despite ceasefire 
agreements being in place) has limited scope for such plans being resurrected.  
 
Renewed tensions around drug narratives: UNODC’s ‘Myanmar 2018 Opium Survey’  
 
There has long been a ‘blame game’ around drug issues with the Myanmar military and 
EAOs blaming each other. In the few instances where drugs had been discussed in early 
years of the peace process, emphasis has been given for the need for all sides to work 
together. However, the UNODC’s ‘Myanmar Opium Survey 2018’ report generated 
significant controversy by making specific – and erroneous – allegations against certain 
EAOs. The report stated that the highest density of poppy cultivation was located in areas 
controlled by certain ethnic armed organisations, including the KIO in Kachin State and the 
Pa-O National Liberation Army (PNLA) and the RCSS in southern Shan State. The report 
failed to acknowledge that the areas of highest opium density in Kachin State are regions 
under the control of army-backed militias and in areas under government control close to 
military barracks. In southern Shan State, the report seems to have confused the PNLA 
with a different armed group – the Pa-O National Organisation – which had a longstanding 
ceasefire with the government and whose armed wing had transformed into an army-
controlled militia in 2009. The report provoked angry responses from both the KIO and the 
RCSS, outraged at the highly partisan tone of the report and the basic errors it contained 
(KIO Central Committee, 2019). The KIO subsequently produced its own report surveying 
opium production across 19 townships in Kachin State and northern Shan State. The report 
found more than double the level of opium cultivation recorded by the UNODC survey of the 
previous year, much of it in areas ostensibly under government control or army-backed 
militias. This incident reveals how little policy space has emerged over the past decade to 
address drug issues and suggests that the current situation surrounding contested drug 
narratives is now closer to the situation of the 1990s and 2000s rather than the optimism of 
the early years of the peace process. 
 
Wider engagement on the drugs issues and their relationship to armed conflict and 
peacebuilding 
 
Despite the lack of engagement on drug issues in the formal peace process, several 
organisations have sought to emphasise the importance of drugs to wider understandings 
of the political economy of Myanmar’s armed conflict. Notable examples include: 
Transnational Institute, which has for many years provided in-depth and ground-breaking 
analysis of the country’s ethnic conflict, drug issues, and wider development challenges 
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especially in relation to land issues and democratisation; International Crisis Group, 
which has a strong interest in drug issues in Myanmar and emphasises the importance of 
incorporating drug issues into political economy analysis of the country’s armed conflict and 
the challenges of peacebuilding; The Asia Foundation, which conducts extensive research 
on conflict-related issues, including a ‘Peace and conflict in Myanmar Discussion Paper 
Series’; various civil society organisations have produced periodic reports on the 
intersections between drugs, armed conflict and the peace process since 2010, including 
SHAN, Lahu National Development Organisation, Kachin Women’s Association of 
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7. Conclusion  
 
This working paper has explored the issues and stakeholders around illicit drugs in 
Myanmar – and especially its borderlands – across the fields of drug policy, health, 
development and peacebuilding. It highlights that illicit drug economies are embedded in 
Myanmar’s complex governance structures and power relations. 
  
By reaching a nuanced understanding of how drug issues cut across these areas, the 
Drugs & (dis)order project seeks to advance opportunities to engage a range of 
stakeholders with the findings of its research in Kachin and Shan states. In doing so it 
contributes to relevant debates and supporting policy and programmes based on an 
understanding of the complexities of illicit drug economies. In conclusion, we identify 
several key points for further consideration.  
 
1. Domestic drugs policy and practice: Rife with disconnects and contradictions  
 
Despite amended national drugs laws and policies which state that individual and public 
health are cornerstones of a national drugs approach, people who use drugs and 
subsistence drugs cultivators bear the brunt of drug policies and face the constant threat of 
arrest. 
 
The limitations and inequities in how drugs policy frameworks and legislations are enacted 
at the local level create significant tensions. Local communities see the pervasive 
availability of drugs, and experience the health and social implications of widespread use, 
yet the production, trade and profit in illicit drugs seem immune from enforcement. The only 
visible law enforcement efforts target users and small-scale poppy farmers, resulting in a 
recursive cycle of arrest, incarceration or compromised livelihoods. The result is that the 
harms from drugs disproportionately affect the most marginalised populations, while 
simultaneously excluding them from any of the benefits derived from the profits from illicit 
economies.  
 
2. The most influential actors shaping the drug economy are the hardest for 
international actors to interact with and influence 
 
China is the most significant international actor in Myanmar’s borderlands, with complex 
economic, security and geopolitical interests. Other influential actors that are hard for 
international actors to reach include the Myanmar Army, army-backed militias, ethnic armed 
organisations and various Chinese actors (government, security forces, businesses at both 
the state and provincial level).  
 
Other stakeholders – such as western governments and INGOs – are much easier to reach 
and interact with, but they themselves are grappling with the challenges of how to have an 
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3. Significant tensions between drug production and drug use 
 
There remain major tensions and trade-offs in places where drug cultivation is essential to 
livelihoods, but where drug-related harms are substantial. Here, drugs both mitigate and 
exacerbate poverty and vulnerability. This presents a substantial challenge to any efforts to 
achieve alternative development or harm reduction. 
 
4. Drugs: A low political priority in the borderlands 
 
Drug issues have always been afforded a lower priority than other issues in drug-producing 
borderland regions. 
 
Counterinsurgency, state-building and opening borderland regions for resource extraction, 
trade and development have always been bigger priorities and the drug trade has often 
become embedded within these activities. This has resulted in a major disconnect between 
concerns over drug-related harms among borderland populations, and the willingness and 
ability of Myanmar’s political system to address these concerns. This disconnect is likely to 
grow further following the February 2021 military coup. 
 
5. Fragmented political authority shapes the possibilities for health-based 
approaches to drugs 
 
Kachin State and Shan State are characterised by highly fragmented political authority. In 
these places, the very actors needed to exert influence in support of health-based 
approaches to drug issues – Tatmadaw, army-backed militias, EAOs and Chinese actors – 
are the hardest to reach and influence. 
 
International actors concerned with responding to the HIV epidemic, largely driven by 
injecting drug use, have channelled their support through large multilateral organisations 
like the Global Fund, which work through the national government. Implementation of such 
programmes thus becomes caught up in the geographical limits of state control, or in the 
challenges of negotiating complex local politics and landscapes of authority in the 
borderlands.  
 
6. Disconnects between local and national/international narratives on harm 
reduction shape the outcome of interventions 
 
Experience of implementing harm reduction programmes has revealed a profound 
disconnect between the mainstream international harm reduction narrative, and the way 
that drug harms are understood and experienced by local people. In order to move towards 
inclusive and effective programming, there is a need for education around drug issues, as 
part of addressing forms of stigma and damage caused by problematic responses to drug 
use and harm. At the same time, there is a need for external programmes to engage more 
deeply with local narratives, attitudes and beliefs around drug issues, to understand how 
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7. Space to include drugs in a negotiated peace may now be closed 
 
The fact that drug-related harms increased under prolonged ceasefires has created distrust 
in narratives of ceasefires, peace and development. Despite hopes that the peace process 
would open up space to address drugs, the absence of discussions around narcotics in the 
negotiations, and the simultaneous proliferation of the production and trade in drugs, 
indicated the vested interests of those involved.  
 
Given the stagnation of the peace process, worsening conflict and finally a military coup, 
the potential policy space to include drugs in a negotiated peace may well now be 
completely closed. It may become even harder to engage with sensitive issues like drugs, 
especially in areas where government administrative reach is limited but where the 
government largely precludes engagement with the armed organisations that operate as de 
facto service providers for many of the country’s most vulnerable populations. 
 
8. A possible future opportunity 
 
There has always been a strong resistance to external influence in Myanmar. This is 
exemplified by theatrical dynamics around drugs, in which all stakeholders – national and 
international – commit to ending drug production, but in reality there is little political space in 
which to address drug issues.  
 
However, one potential opening space for stakeholder engagement might lie at the 
intersection between security and health. Phylogenetics of HIV subtypes indicate that 
recombinant strains of HIV across Southeast Asia and into northern India originate in 
Myanmar’s northern borderlands. The implications of infectious disease for national and 
regional security are very real, as COVID-19 has demonstrated.  
 
Internal and external stakeholders exploring the health and security interface and how to 
address novel and emerging threats will find themselves trying to understand the illicit 
economies and the actors that facilitate and protect them. The search for common 
understandings of how to respond and prevent very real threats will ensure that all 
stakeholders will have to confront the nexus of drugs and its competing narratives in ways 
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